Abstract. This paper uses recent legislation in Austria to establish a link between sovereign reputation and yield spreads. In 2009, Hypo Alpe Adria International, a bank previously co-owned by the regional government of Carinthia, had been nationalized by Austria's central government in order to avoid a default triggering multi-billion Euro local government guarantees. In 2015, special legislation retroactively introduced collective action clauses allowing a haircut on both the bonds and the guarantees while avoiding formal default. We document that legislative and administrative action designed to partly abrogate the guarantees resulted in a loss of reputation, leading to higher yield spreads for sovereign debt. Our analysis of covered bonds uncovers an increase in yield spreads on the secondary market and a deterioration of primary market conditions. JEL classification: G12, G14, H63.
INTRODUCTION
Reputation plays an important role in financial markets as it potentially resolves the inherent conflict of interest between capital seekers and investors. For corporate debt markets, Diamond (1989) shows that issuers with a short credit history face a comparably high cost of debt and act opportunistically in their decision whether to accept a high default probability. In contrast, issuers with a long track record of complying with contractual arrangements have built up reputation, which allows them to borrow cheaply going forward. For such issuers reputation itself becomes a valuable asset. Reputable issuers are reluctant to default as they realize that the potential short-term gain is more than offset in the long run by higher financing costs. In sovereign debt markets, reputation may be of particular importance as sovereigns are not subject to standard bankruptcy regulations and they have the possibility to ex-post change the institutional and legal framework to influence the value of claims they have issued in the past.
However, the long-term benefits from building up reputation in the sovereign debt market may not be fully internalized in the political process, for example due to inter-generational conflicts of interest or simply due to the specific cycle of election periods. Existing empirical evidence on the value of reputation for sovereigns is largely focused on the impact of sovereign defaults, both in terms of capital market exclusion and increased cost of borrowing. In a review article, Panizza et al. (2009) find weak evidence for theories of reputation in sovereign debt markets. In contrast, the survey by Tomz and Wright (2013) concludes that defaulters temporarily lose access to capital markets and subsequently pay substantially higher interest rates. A recent empirical estimate for the increase in borrowing costs is given by Cruces and Trebesch (2013) , stating a range of 3-4%.
Identifying the value of sovereign reputation in capital markets empirically is challenging, since most events signal information about both the sovereign's ability to repay debt claims as well as its willingness to do so. Only the latter should be related to the value of reputation. For example, if Argentina decides to default on its debt, this may signal something about the country's decision makers' expectations about the future ability to repay debt as well as its governance structure which affects the country's willingness to pay.
This paper presents an empirical study to shed light on whether reputation effects are indeed present in the sovereign credit markets. It involves the Federal Republic of Austria, a sovereign rated Aaa by Moody's and AA+ by S&P and Fitch so that its short-and medium-term ability to pay for its debt is not in question. More specifically, the study focuses on the debt restructuring of Hypo Alpe Adria International Bank AG, a large regional bank that was initially co-owned by the regional government of Carinthia, before being sold to Bayerische Landesbank in 2007. In the wake of the financial crisis, in December 2009, the bank was nationalized through a purchase by the Republic of Austria for EUR 1. At this time, the bank had bonds outstanding which were guaranteed by the province of Carinthia, with a face value of about EUR 20 billion.
By November 2014, it became apparent that the bank's business model was no longer viable and the bank's assets and liabilities were therefore largely transferred to HETA, a run-down corporation. At that time the estimated value of the assets was significantly below the face value of the remaining debt that was guaranteed by Carinthia. Since Austrian provinces' have almost no possibilities to levy their own taxes, they rely almost exclusively on tax transfers from the federal government. There was thus some legal dispute on the extent to which the federal government is in fact liable for Carinthia's guarantees. Since the Republic of Austria had already injected approximately EUR 5.5 billion in capital until December 2014, there was mounting pressure from opposition parties and the popular press on the federal government to stop using tax payers' money to honor Carinthia's debt guarantees.
From summer 2014 to fall 2015, a series of legislative and administrative actions made clear that the Austrian government was indeed going to repudiate at least some contractual terms of HETA bonds. For example, in the fall of 2014, Austria was the first EU country to implement the Banking Recovery and Resolution Directive into national law (Bundesgesetz € uber die Sanierung und Abwicklung von Banken, BaSAG) which explicitly states that the law can be applied not only to banks, but also to run-down corporations like HETA. The most striking single event was the administrative decision from 1 March 2015 by the Austrian Financial Markets Authority to indeed apply BaSAG to HETA and impose a temporary moratorium on any payments of interest or principal repayment, including those on debt guaranteed by the regional government of Carinthia.
The moratorium created the possibility for the Republic of Austria to subsequently introduce the legal basis for a collective action clause for HETA bonds. This actually happened in October 2015, when Austria changed the
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Finanzmarktstabilit€ atsgesetz to allow the federal minister of finance to make a repurchase offer to certain HETA bondholders. If such a repurchase offer is accepted by a two-thirds majority, it limits the claims of the non-consenting bondholders against the province of Carinthia. To our knowledge, a similar change in legal terms of bonds has been implemented just once in recent years, in the case of the Greek bond restructuring (see Zettelmeyer et al., 2013 , for a detailed description). We provide a narrative of the background of the HETA restructuring attempts and the offer to bondholders in appendix A, and refer to M€ uller and Zahradnik (2015) for a description from a legal perspective.
Media reports, comments by analysts, and reports by rating agencies around the time of the introduction of the moratorium indicate that this moratorium may have triggered a reputational loss, not just for the regional government of Carinthia, but also for the central government and other, non-governmental issuers from Austria. The specific circumstances are of particular interest to the analysis of the effects of reputation on borrowing costs since we can focus on those Austrian issuers for which this event could not have affected their perceived ability to repay debt, but it may have had an effect on the market's perception of their willingness to pay.
We therefore focus our analysis on the cost of borrowing of the Republic of Austria itself and on covered bond issues. In the case of the Republic of Austria, if anything, the effect on the ability to repay its sovereign debt should have improved, rather than deteriorated in the wake of the moratorium. This is so since the moratorium created additional opportunities to limit the value of Carinthia's guarantees, and thus the potential liabilities of the federal government as well. If we find negative effects on the perceived credit risk of the Republic of Austria, it is likely to occur via changes in the perceived willingness to pay. To this end we analyze changes in yields of long-term government bonds, changes in credit default swaps (CDS) spreads, and changes in the spreads of central government bonds issued under foreign law relative to local law government bonds.
We believe that the covered bond market is also well suited to explore reputation effects. This is so because the credit risk of a covered bond is substantially determined by the quality of the assets pledged and the legal uncertainties whether creditors will actually be able to seize the pledged assets of a defaulted issuer. Since we use a sample of covered bonds with real estate as collateral, it is unlikely that there will be significant direct effects of the introduction of the moratorium on the value of those assets. By contrast, introduction of the moratorium may significantly affect the trust that the financial market puts in the legal quality of the asset pledge behind the covered bonds. We therefore explore effects of the moratorium on the primary market for covered bonds as well as on long-term credit spreads for a representative sample of Austrian issuers of covered bonds.
We compare long-term financing costs of Austrian issuers relative to benchmark countries from three months before the moratorium to three months thereafter. Based on long-term government bond yields, CDS spreads, and the foreign law bonds to domestic law bonds yield spread, we find an increase in the relative refinancing cost for the Austrian central government of 7-15 basis points. Relative yields of covered bonds increase by six basis points for debt collateralized with mortgages. Yield changes of regional government bonds and covered bonds O. Randl and J. Zechner collateralized with public loans are even more pronounced but might incorporate other effects than changes in reputation. Using a series of Chow tests, we find compelling evidence for the existence of structural breaks in the time series of relative refinancing costs, and high probabilities for their timing around the announcement day of the HETA moratorium. Therefore we provide strong evidence that reputation impacts the pricing of debt instruments even for issuers with strong fundamentals.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we outline the empirical methods. We present the results in section 3. Section 4 concludes.
EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
We are interested in the change of the long-term spread of selected groups of Austrian issuers relative to appropriate benchmarks, caused by the loss of reputation due to HETA legislation. Based on the narrative of events, we choose 1 March 2015 as the point in time where the most severe loss of reputation took place. This specific choice of a single-day event is likely to bias our results against finding effects, because (1) the loss of reputation might have been more gradual, and (2) financial markets tend to anticipate events at least partly.
We measure the impact on financing costs, reflected by changes in spreads of government debt yields, CDS, and yields of covered bonds. We hereby consider the time period from 1 December 2014 to 31 May 2015. For central government bonds, we download zero curves directly from Bloomberg, select a long-term maturity (15 years), 1 and calculate the difference between Austrian and benchmark yields. To analyze the impact from the loss of reputation due to HETA-driven legislation on government bond yields, we have to define a proper benchmark. German government bonds might have benefited from liquidity events and excellent economic fundamentals. Therefore we form a peer group which is better comparable but did not experience a loss of reputation in the financial market. We employ Belgium, Finland, France, and the Netherlands as benchmark countries, which are the closest comparable countries within the Eurozone with respect to credit ratings and liquidity.
2 Table 1 provides credit ratings as of March 2015. Other Eurozone countries with the exception of Germany either have lower ratings or a too small government bond market (e.g., Luxembourg). Similarly, we compare the change in Austrian government CDS spreads relative to benchmark countries' CDS. We use five-year USD CDS from Datastream. We provide tickers of the actual series used for yields and CDS in Appendix B, Table B1. 1. We select 15 year maturity as this is the average maturity at issuance needed to match the average maturity of outstanding Austrian government debt. 2. While the Netherlands join Germany as a AAA-rated sovereign issuer, German government bonds serve as the true riskfree asset in the Eurozone. Yields of German Bunds might be more severely distorted from the European Central Bank's quantitative easing program than government bond yields of other countries. Under the ECB's public sector purchase program, the share of purchases in a national central bank's home market is determined by the ECB's capital key, which gives Germany a weight of 25.6%. Germany's 2014 budget surplus contrasts with an average Eurozone deficit of 2.6% according to Eurostat, rendering its government bonds scarce relative to those of other Eurozone countries.
For the other security types that we investigate, yield curves are not readily available. These are Austrian bonds issued under foreign law, regional government bonds, and covered bonds. Here we proceed by estimating spreads over a benchmark curve, and extracting the long-term spread component. For Austrian government bonds issued under foreign law we use the Austrian (domestic law) zero coupon government yield curve as a benchmark. For regional government bonds in CHF, we use the Swiss government bond curve, and for covered bonds the German government bond yield curve. To analyze long-term spreads using a set of individual bonds, we have to account for the fact that bonds change their characteristics over time, in particular their time to maturity. In addition, there is only a limited number of bonds available, so we cannot directly compare the maturities we are interested in. We therefore resort to parametric estimation of the long-term spread, similar to the approach of Nelson and Siegel (1987) for modeling yield curves. In order to mitigate estimation problems that stem from a small number of bonds, we resort to a two step procedure. In the first step, we estimate slope, curvature, and long-term spread from equation 1, keeping the parameters constant over time for each bond group. 3 The objective function that we minimize is the sum of the squared pricing errors over all bonds i of group g and all dates t:
where P i;t is the market price of bond i at time t, m i are the dates of cash flows CF i;m i (later than t), y t;m i is the benchmark (government) yield curve at time t with maturity m i , and s = 0.1368925 years, i.e., 50 days. 4 In the second step of the estimation procedure, described in equation 2, we obtain a time series of long-term spreads. Here we use b 1 and b 2 from equation 1 as constant input parameters and estimate a separate long-term spread component b ðjÞ 0;t for each point in time t and for every subgroup j of issuers. We perform this step for subgroups j, as we estimate the long-term spread components of covered bonds separately for Austria and the benchmark countries, and distinguish covered bonds according to the type of collateral.
where s t;m i ¼ b
We calculate relative spreads d g t as differences in the long-term spread components of the long-term spreads of Austrian (AT) minus benchmark (bm) countries' bonds. For covered bonds (cb), we calculate d for all groups g, with t Ã = 1 March 2015. This is our main measure of interest. For all sets of bonds we test for a structural break at t Ã , using an F-test (Chow, 1960) . The bond sets are summarized in Table 2 , with additional details provided in Tables B2, B3 , and B4 in Appendix B.
RESULTS
In this section, we first provide evidence for the increase in the yields of government bonds relative to the appropriate benchmarks. Next, we quantify the 
Central government
We compare (1) changes in yields of long-term government bonds, (2) CDS, and (3) spreads of central government bonds issued under foreign law relative to local law government bonds. Figure 1 illustrates our main findings.
Yield comparison with benchmark countries
The left-hand chart of Figure 1 shows a marked increase in Austrian 15-year government bond yields relative to the benchmark countries. While Austria is still able to refinance its debt at a lower rate than its peer group, this advantage has halved around the announcement date of the HETA moratorium. The increase of approximately nine basis points would be difficult to explain by a deterioration of Austria's ability to pay, since the legislation was designed to reduce the impact of HETA losses on the Austrian budget. A potential caveat is a possible distortion from the start of the ECB's Public Sector Purchase Program which started on 9 March 2015 and might have had a country and maturity-specific impact on government bond yields, confounding the effect from the moratorium.
CDS
Ang and Longstaff (2013) argue that sovereign credit risk is better measured using CDS data than from analyzing sovereign debt spreads. This is because the latter can be driven by factors unrelated to credit risk, as for example supply changes or liquidity. Klingler and Lando (2015) agree that CDS are often seen as a cleaner measure of credit quality, partly because of higher capital requirement for arbitrageurs when they hold bonds relative to gaining exposure through the CDS markets. The event date we investigate is close to the start of the ECB's expanded asset purchase program which is likely to have had an impact on bond yields and liquidity. More specifically, the yield changes we analyze might be distorted if the change in bond yields due to Q.E. were different for Austria and the peer group. 5 To account for this potential problem, we therefore also measure of credit risk by comparing five-year USD CDS for Austria against the benchmark countries. The results confirm our previous findings. While CDS for Austria have traded at lower spreads than the benchmark, this advantage has been reduced by seven basis points over the six months investigated (see the center chart of Figure 1 ).
Foreign law bonds
In the right-hand chart of Figure 1 we plot the time series of the long-term yield spread of Austrian government bonds issued under foreign (English) law in excess of local law bonds.
6 Employing the estimation method described in section 2, we generally observe a positive spread which is consistent with the lower liquidity of these bonds. However, we find that this spread drops around 1 March 2015. Note that a lower foreign to local law spread is equivalent to a higher financing cost for local law bonds. Therefore the direction of the change is consistent with our prior findings, even if the magnitude of the change might be affected by the small number of foreign law bonds and their low liquidity. Our findings appear in line with Chamon et al. (2015) who provide evidence that a sizable legal safety premium is observed only for weak debtors.
Statistical significance
To assess the statistical and economic significance of our findings, we report detailed results in Table 3 . For government bonds, the column labeled yield reports summary statistics for the difference of Austrian zero-coupon yields with 15 years maturity relative to the benchmark countries. The sub-periods are marked by a statistically significant difference of 9 bp in the level of this spread. A Chow test clearly indicates a breakpoint around 1 March 2015; among all possible breakpoints between 1 January 2015 and 30 April 2015, 7 the F-value of a Chow test is lower for 97% of all dates than for 1 March 2015. This indicates that 1 March 2015 is a 5. However, analyzing the ECB's asset purchase program, Andrade et al. (2016) find no evidence for market segmentation. Furthermore, they document that the level of government bond yields starts to adjust already around the announcement of the program, on 22 January, with a further reduction in yields around the implementation date, 9 March. 6. We cross-check that these bonds are included in the ECB's list of eligible marketable assets.
Therefore comparison with domestic law bonds should not be subject to a differential liquidity effect related to the start of the extended asset purchase program. 7. To ensure a sufficient number of data points in each one of the F-tests we perform, we exclude the first month and the last month of the period analyzed from the search for breakpoints.
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reasonable choice for the structural break. Column CDS shows that the economically significant deterioration of 7.2 basis points in CDS levels compared to benchmark countries is also statistically significant. The third column, FL, reports statistics of the yield spread of foreign law bonds over the Austrian government curve. Presumably due to low liquidity, Austrian foreign law bonds are traded at higher yields. This difference shrank by about 15 basis points, which can equivalently be interpreted as evidence that a legal safety premium is emerging. The magnitude of the effect is consistent with the observations by Chamon et al. (2015) for high quality debtors. The diagrams in Figure 2 provide evidence that our results are not sensitive to the length of the estimation window. The bulk of the spread difference is observable for windows of AE30 days around the event date. Furthermore, to ensure that the results for foreign law bonds are not driven by the choice to model spreads using the Nelson and Siegel (1987) approach, we alternatively estimate the longterm spread component by the difference in yield relative to the maturity-matched domestic law bond and find similar results.
Regional government and covered bonds

Regional government bonds
As further evidence, we analyze the long-term component of the spread of regional government bonds issued in foreign currency (i.e., CHF) relative to the foreign (i.e., Swiss) zero coupon government yield curve. A list of the bonds is provided in Appendix B, Table B3 . Bond buying under the ECB's quantitative easing program does not have a direct effect on this set of bonds. The increase in the yield spread equals approximately 27 bp, as seen in the left hand chart of Figure 3 . While our sample does not comprise bonds from the region of Carinthia, the uncertainty related to regional governments might exacerbate the impact from reputational concerns. Column regional of Table 3 shows that the difference is statistically significant, and there is clear evidence for a structural break around 1 March 2015.
Covered bonds
Covered bonds are of particular interest in our analysis because to value these instruments, investors have to assess both the credit-worthiness of the issuer and
Yield
Difference in basis points
Window half length the quality of the pledge; this comprises the legal environment that determines whether it will actually be possible for a creditor to seize the pledged assets of a defaulting issuer. Prokopczuk and Vonhoff (2012) find in their analysis of the European covered bond market that a significant portion of the variation in covered bond spreads can be attributed to the legislative framework, especially during crises. We obtain a sample of covered bonds from Bloomberg, using the search criteria summarized in Table B4 of Appendix B, and split the sample into bonds backed by public assets and instruments collateralized by mortgages. We only use bonds for our empirical analysis that were assigned an initial rating of AAA or AA+ equivalent by S&P, Moody's or Fitch. While covered bonds should have relatively low sensitivity to adverse events given the high and multi-layer level of protection, investors who saw the value of a public guarantee reduced might update their evaluation of potential legal enforcement risks to actually seize pledged assets in case of a default. The center chart of Figure 3 refers to bonds collateralized by loans to the public sector. It displays the difference in the long-term component of credit spreads of Austrian bonds minus the spread of the peer group. The red lines correspond to the means before and after 1 March 2015, respectively, with a difference in spreads equal to 10 bp. While one could argue that the value of outstanding public loans as collateral might have changed due to the moratorium and feed through covered bond prices, this argument is unlikely in the case of covered bonds collateralized by mortgages. The right-hand chart of Figure 3 shows an increase in relative spreads of six basis points for this group of bonds. Both differences are statistically significant. The evidence for a structural break around the event date can be seen in Table 3 from columns public and mortgage. Similar to subsection 3.1 we conduct a robustness analysis to see whether the results are sensitive to the length of the estimation
Regional Gvt
Long term spread in basis points window and the computation of yield spreads. Figure 4 indicates that this is not the case.
Primary market for covered bonds
Higher spreads of outstanding covered bonds should be associated with bond issuance. Therefore we identify a sample of newly issued covered bonds where we hand collect deal sheets to analyze the investor base. We describe the selection process in Table B5 in Appendix B. To obtain a meaningful sample size, we extend the selection criteria for the primary market analysis to include also covered bonds collateralized with mortgages and a longer time period from July 2013 to December 2015. Figure 5 illustrates the market base for these bonds. The left hand and center charts show clearly that the proportion of covered bonds issued by Austrian banks and sold to foreign countries has sharply diminished after March 2015. The average proportion of German investors shrank from 55% to 33% and the proportion of countries other than Germany or Austria from 29% to 19%. Consequently, the domestic market increased in importance. This shift could happen thanks to increased purchases from central banks, increasing their share of primary market covered bond emissions from 8% to 32%. Furthermore, Figure 5 illustrates that the type of collateral of newly issued Austrian covered bonds was primarily constituted by claims against governmental entities up to mid-2014 but mortgages after mid-2015. Thus, debt claims against Austrian governmental entities were basically no longer used as collateral by issuers of covered bonds after the HETA moratorium. Panel (b) of Figure 5 shows that for our sample not only the proportion of covered bonds sold to foreign investors
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Window half length has declined but also the absolute amount. 8 This is in line with the theory by Broner et al. (2010) , where foreign creditors face higher risk and will therefore reduce their exposure if confidence weakens.
3.3. Cost-benefit Trade-off Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) model the trade-off faced by sovereign issuers: While debt repudiation gives immediate financial benefits it also imposes costs in the form of limited access to debt markets or adverse future funding terms. While we cannot precisely calculate costs and benefits associated with potential HETA debt repudiation, we will discuss important components of the trade-off and provide orders of magnitude.
Potential savings
The maximum benefit from partially reneging on the public guarantees on HETA bonds is the difference between the amount owed by the government and the amount paid to investors. Given that the regional government did not issue but only guarantee HETA bonds, bond investors could certainly expect to receive at least the value of the assets of the issuer, as standard bankruptcy rules would apply. In January 2016 the regional government of Carinthia made investors an offer backed by the Austrian central government. The original offer, which was rejected by investors, was later sweetened by the government. The initial offer is therefore likely to overstate the potential gains for the government. Under its terms, senior (subordinate) bondholders would have received 75 (30)% of notional; with the HETA assets evaluated to cover 59.91% of senior bondholders' claims. The offer comprised EUR 9.9 billion senior and EUR 0.9 billion subordinate bonds. However, 1.4 billion of those senior HETA bonds were either held by government-owned institutions or guaranteed by (other) regional governments. Government savings therefore would not exceed 25% of EUR 8.5 billion plus 70% of EUR 0.9 billion. Even the resulting amount of EUR 2.75 billion might constitute a rather optimistic estimate of potential savings, as it leaves aside substantial legal costs, and the effect on corporate tax income from losses reducing the tax base of Austrian banks and insurance companies.
Potential costs
Austrian public debt amounts to approximately EUR 278 billion (as of December 2014). About EUR 244 billion is central government debt, EUR 1 billion related to social security, and EUR 33 billion to regional and local governments. Under the assumption of constant debt levels, a permanent increase in funding costs of one basis point therefore translates into an annual cost of EUR 28 million. To 8. We are unable to obtain deal sheets for the peer group and therefore cannot implement a diff-indiff analysis for this part of our analysis. However, we obtain indicative evidence using aggregate data on covered bond issuance from Bloomberg. Total issuance by Austrian entities was EUR 11.7 billion in the 12 months before the event date and EUR 13.2 billion in the year thereafter (an increase of 12.5%). In contrast, issuance by benchmark countries increased by 118.5%. Thus, the issuance dynamics for covered bonds was different in Austria compared to the peer group.
wipe out the potential savings, an increase of 10 basis points over 10 years would be sufficient, which appears not unrealistic given the observed increases in spreads in the range of 7-15 basis points for the central government and 27 basis points for regional governments. However, due to the long average maturity of Austrian government bonds on the one hand and persistent budget deficits on the other hand, costs will be lower initially but underestimate the true cost in the long run if higher spreads persist. There is a question to what extent the yield increase is permanent and to what extent it may be transitory. Broner et al. (2010) argue that that foreigners sell a country's assets during crises to domestic investors, potentially leading to price pressure and thus higher measured spreads. This could be consistent with a part of the yield increase being transitory. On the other hand, our estimates of yield changes might be downward biased due to partial anticipation of the event by market participants. Furthermore, there is evidence that higher financing costs for the public and the banking sector feed through to the real economy, thereby leading to potentially even higher costs (see, e.g., Ciccarelli et al., 2015) . The above discussion suggests that it is difficult to argue that the March 2015 moratorium on guaranteed HETA debt was the result from pure economic costbenefit analysis. This does not necessarily imply irrationality by policy makers. First, the government's initial decision may have partly reflected pressure from opposition parties and/or the general public as well as from the popular press to display a tough stance towards creditors. In addition, it was probably difficult to gauge investor reactions ex-ante, with the observed outcome being unintended. Finally, a significant part of the cost in our back of envelope calculation above will be realized in the more distant future, and thus may not be fully accounted by decision makers in the current election period. Recent developments indicate that the government is now attempting to regain reputation. In September 2016, a substantially improved offer was made to bondholders, raising the compensation to about 90 (45)% of notional for senior (subordinate) bonds. Consistent with an initial loss of Austria's sovereign reputation, important parts of this new offer are subject to English law and German law.
CONCLUSION
This paper finds significant effects of ex post changes to HETA bond contracts on interest rate spreads of Austrian government bonds and covered bonds issued by Austrian financial institutions. We interpret these effects as resulting from a loss of reputation. Specifically, we find that around the announcement of the HETA moratorium on 1 March 2015, 15-year Austrian government bond yields increased by nine basis points relative to a group of peer countries. This finding is confirmed by analysis of the dynamics of Austrian CDS compared to benchmark countries. We also find that yields of Austrian government bonds issued under Austrian law increased relative to those issued under foreign law. Data indicate that the implications for regional governments are even more pronounced: yields of regional government bonds increased sharply. In the absence of legal uncertainty, covered bonds collateralized by mortgages should not be affected by lower creditworthiness of a sovereign. Our finding of a relative increase of six basis points in long-term yields therefore points towards legal uncertainty being priced. We also document changes in the primary market: issuance of public sector covered bonds dried up; mortgages were used as collateral for covered bond issues after the HETA moratorium. In addition the data show a dramatic drop in the purchases of covered bonds by foreign investors, especially those from Germany. This drop was partly compensated by increased demand by the Eurosystem via its PSPP quantitative easing program. Taken together, our results provide strong empirical support for the hypothesis that the reputation of the Austrian public sector has been adversely affected by the announcement of the HETA moratorium. Thus, it appears that even highly rated sovereigns are not immune to changing perceptions of capital market participants and that these effects do not require outright sovereign defaults. We believe that the theoretical and empirical analysis of the channels through which such reputation effects may occur is a promising area for future research.
APPENDIX A A. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
Originally founded as a local bank, in the years before the financial crisis Hypo Alpe Adria International AG expanded rapidly into southeastern Europe. The expansion strategy was facilitated by its ability to issue bonds guaranteed by the regional government of Carinthia, one of nine federal provinces of the Republic of Austria and a co-owner of the bank. In 2007, EU legislation put an end to further guarantees and in the same year the region sold its stake to Bayerische Landesbank who continued the rapid expansion. On the brink of bankruptcy in 2009, HETA was nationalized by the Austrian government. One rationale for nationalization was to shield the Austrian economy from potential repercussions of its then fifth-largest bank collapsing. Another reason was to avoid payments on EUR 20.1 billion bonds guaranteed by the regional government of Carinthia, an amount that likely would require cash transfers by Austria's central government to avoid a default of the region with only about half a million inhabitants. After years of bad news about the quality of the assets and the need of further capital injections by the tax payer, in 2014 the Austrian government and authorities established a strategy to impose a part of the losses on the bondholders despite the existing guarantees, while still avoiding a default of the region. M€ uller and Zahradnik (2015) describe the legal developments which can be summarized as follows: In August 2014, a law (HaaSanG) declared subordinated Heta bonds and the associated guarantees non-existent. While this law later was nullified, it made the government's intention clear: The original contractual terms should be modified ex-post, in a way detrimental to investors. In late 2014, the Austrian parliament decided that the Austrian law to implement the European Banking Recovery and Resolution Directive, BaSAG, would also be applicable for liquidation entities without banking license. This paved the way for a potential bail-in of HETA creditors; seemingly the Austrian government was willing to at Sovereign Reputation and Yield Spreads least partially repudiate contractual terms of HETA bonds. On 1 March 2015, the Austrian Financial Markets Authority imposed a temporary stop of any payments of interest or redemption amounts including those on debt guaranteed by the regional government of Carinthia. To many market participants, the decision was surprising as it includes senior and guaranteed debt. The limited time frame of debt relief, up to May 2016, made it obvious to market participants that the government would take further steps to implement BaSAG on HETA. 9 In July 2015, the Austrian Constitutional Court nullified HaaSanG because it was opposed to fundamental property rights. In October 2015, the law on the stability of financial markets (Finanzmarktstabilit€ atsG) made it possible to introduce ex-post collective action clauses to HETA bond terms that would also enable a binding vote to limit the regional government's outstanding guarantees.
The strategy envisaged by the government can be seen as coercive since it gives leeway to push creditors toward accepting a potentially unfair offer. In principle an investor should not accept an offer that is below the fair value of his claim. To see why the ex post introduction of collective action clauses can be detrimental to investors, consider the following simple structure of an offer, outlined in Table A1 . The liable party offers a vote to reduce the notional amount to A but pays those investors who vote yes a premium of B. Hence, if the vote goes through, accepting investors receive A + B, while opposing investors get only A. If the offer fails, everyone gets the fair value, C. If investors cannot coordinate, a single investor cannot influence the outcome and will therefore find it optimal to consent, even if A + B < C. Notes: The Bloomberg search using the above criteria gives us 16 bonds. For 10 bonds out of this sample (plus one that fulfills the criteria but is not result of the search) we are able to obtain deal sheets that provide detailed primary market information. Original sources for the deal sheets are Commerzbank (3 deal sheets), Erste Bank (2), Natixis (2), DZ Bank (2), LBBW (1), and Societe Generale (1).
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